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I. INTRODUCTION
1

In State v. Glowacki, the Minnesota Supreme Court grappled
with whether Minnesota’s general self-defense rule requiring
retreat applies when co-residents fight at home, or whether an
2
exception grounded in the castle doctrine should apply. The
court chose the latter path, ruling that co-residents may stand their

† J.D. Candidate 2004, William Mitchell College of Law; B.A. Augsburg
College, 1989; M.S.J. Northwestern University Medill School of Journalism, 1992.
1. 630 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. 2001) [hereinafter Glowacki].
2. Id. at 399 (noting that generally retreat is required by law “if reasonably
possible” before acting in self-defense). See also BLACK’ S LAW DICTIONARY 209 (7th
ed. 1999) (defining castle doctrine as the criminal law “exception to the retreat rule
allowing the use of deadly force by a person who is protecting his or her home and
its inhabitants from attack, esp. from a trespasser who intends to commit a felony
or inflict serious bodily harm”).
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ground in the home as long as their force is reasonable. Ruling
otherwise, the court said, would push residents from their safest
place, would confuse juries hearing cases involving battered
woman’s syndrome, would require parents to consider abandoning
their children, and would force residents to differentiate between
4
co-residents and intruders.
This note traces how retreat rules developed in the United
States and in Minnesota, and how the rules affect battered women
5
in particular. Next, the note summarizes how the Glowacki trial
court gave an erroneous duty-to-retreat jury instruction amid
conflicting accusations involving the defendant’s physical
6
confrontation with his live-in girlfriend. The note then explains
the rationales that the Minnesota Supreme Court employed to
enact a co-resident no-retreat rule that deviates from the state’s
7
general rule requiring retreat. Next, the note criticizes both the
court’s reasoning and the new rule, concluding that Glowacki was
not a good case for making law, and asserting that the no-retreat
standard is an imprudent departure from Minnesota’s general
8
retreat rule. Finally, this note proposes a self-defense standard for
co-residents that resists the American tendency to hastily dismiss
retreat, yet also provides exceptions for when safe escape is
impossible, great peril must be averted, or battered woman’s
9
syndrome is at issue.

3. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 402:
[W]e adopt the following rule: There is no duty to retreat from one’s
home when acting in self-defense in the home, regardless of whether
the aggressor is a co-resident. But the lack of a duty to retreat does not
abrogate the obligation to act reasonably when using force in selfdefense.
Id.
4. Id. at 400-02.
5. See infra Part II.
6. See infra Part III.A.
7. See infra Part III.B.
8. See infra Parts IV.A, IV.B.
9. See infra Part IV.C.
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II. HISTORY OF THE DUTY TO RETREAT
A. In the United States
1. Standing One’s Ground Is the American Way
From the battlefield to the baseball field, Americans are loath
10
to retreat. In criminal law, sometimes allowing defenders to stand
their ground even when retreat is possible is seen as a necessary,
albeit unfortunate, part of self-defense amid perceptions that there
are more guns on the street and less security in the one place
where Americans should feel the safest: at home, surrounded by
11
family.
The United States repudiated the English preference for
retreating instead of fighting during the 1800s as the rebellious
nation sought to distinguish American bravery from British
12
13
cowardice.
No-retreat rules took root in the Colonies and
10. In 1778, George Washington scolded Maj. Gen. Charles Lee for “an
unnecessary, disorderly, and shameful retreat” during the Revolutionary War’s
Battle
of
Monmouth.
The
Papers
of
George
Washington,
http://gwpapers.virginia.edu/revolution/lee/lee3.html (last visited Sept. 29,
2002). Hours after loaded jetliners slammed into the World Trade Center and
Pentagon on Sept. 11, 2001, President George W. Bush commenced a War on
Terrorism by telling the nation that terrorists had failed “to frighten our nation
into chaos and retreat.” A Day of Terror; Bush’s Remarks to the Nation on the Terrorist
Attacks, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 12, 2001, at A4. After baseball commissioner Bud Selig
halted the 2002 All-Star Game at a 7-7 tie, fans chanted “Let them play!” and
“Refund!” Associated Press, No pitchers are left, so game ends in tie, ST. PAUL PIONEER
PRESS, July 10, 2002, at 1D.
11. “The family is supposed to protect us from the violent world. All too
often, however, this is not the case.” OLA W. BARNETT ET AL., FAMILY VIOLENCE
ACROSS THE LIFESPAN: AN INTRODUCTION 4 (1997). “As statistics show, even in our
suburbs violent crime is rapidly increasing . . . . We are deceived if we take the
casual view that firearms in the home can be controlled to merely deterring, or, at
most, superficially wounding, an assailant in hopes of stopping him.” BRENDAN F.J.
FURNISH & DWIGHT H. SMALL, THE M OUNTING THREAT OF HOME INTRUDERS:
WEIGHING THE M ORAL OPTION OF ARMED SELF-DEFENSE 6 (1993). See also BLACK’ S,
supra note 2, at 1364 (defining self-defense as “[t]he use of force to protect oneself,
one’s family, or one’s property from a real or threatened attack”).
12. RICHARD M AXWELL BROWN, NO DUTY TO RETREAT: VIOLENCE AND VALUES IN
AMERICAN HISTORY AND SOCIETY 5 (1991). The English rule requiring a defender
to retreat “to the wall” before killing in self-defense developed not to reinforce the
sanctity of life, but to allow the Crown to keep its monopoly on conflict resolution.
Id. at 4.
13. Id. at 6 (“The roots of the transformation from the duty to retreat to
standing one’s ground went back to about the time of the American Revolution.”).
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blossomed in the Midwest, where courts saw retreat as a blemish on
a man’s character. In Ohio it was said that a “true man” fought off
14
a violent, unprovoked attack. In Indiana it was noted that the
“tendency of the American mind” was to favor standing one’s
15
ground instead of saving an assailant’s life.
Views favoring fight over flight snowballed in the 20th
16
century, again in the Midwest, when the “sound reason” of the no17
retreat rule was celebrated in Missouri and a rule requiring retreat
18
was rejected as “ancient doctrine” in Wisconsin.
The U.S.
Supreme Court joined in when Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, a
celebrated civil libertarian, wrote that it was unreasonable to
require a would-be defender to ponder retreat: “Detached
reflection,” he said, “cannot be demanded in the presence of an
19
uplifted knife.”
Some states in the Northeast and South held to rules requiring
20
retreat, and they had Harvard University professor Joseph H.
Beale, Jr. on their side:
A really honorable man, a man of truly refined and
elevated feeling, would perhaps always regret the
apparent cowardice of a retreat, but he would regret ten
times more, after the excitement of the contest was past,
the thought that he had the blood of a fellow-being on his
hands. It is undoubtedly distasteful to retreat; but it is ten

14. “[A] true man, who is without fault, is not obliged to fly from an assailant,
who, by violence or surprise, maliciously seeks to take his life or do him enormous
bodily harm.” Erwin v. State, 29 Ohio St. 186, 199-200 (1876). Cf. Susan Estrich,
Defending Women, 88 MICH. L. REV. 1430, 1432 (1990) (reviewing CYNTHIA
GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN, SELF-DEFENSE AND THE LAW
(1989), which asserts that “the retreat requirement is opposed by many precisely
because it limits the manly instinct to stand one’s ground and fight”).
15. “[T]he tendency of the American mind seems to be very strongly against
the enforcement of any rule which requires a person to flee when assailed, to
avoid chastisement or even to save human life . . . .” Runyan v. State, 57 Ind. 80,
84 (1877).
16. BROWN, supra note 12, at 20 (explaining how “energetic state supreme
court justices the length and breadth of the land eloquently and feelingly put
under siege the beleaguered notion of the duty to retreat”).
17. State v. Bartlett, 71 S.W. 148, 151 (Mo. 1902).
18. Miller v. State, 119 N.W. 850, 857 (Wis. 1909).
19. Brown v. United States, 256 U.S. 335, 343 (1921) (reversing a conviction
because the jury was instructed, contrary to Texas law, that the assaulted always
must retreat if safe escape is available). To Holmes, “the right to stand one’s
ground and kill in self-defense was as great a civil liberty as, for example, freedom
of speech.” BROWN, supra note 12, at 36-37.
20. BROWN, supra note 12, at 24.
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21

times more distasteful to kill.
As crime rates rose in the latter half of the 20th century,
Americans increasingly voiced a right to self-defense as debate
intensified over levels of force available to protect self, family, and
22
home.
2. Retreat Rules Today
Today, nineteen states reflect the nation’s reluctance to retreat
and generally do not require a faultless defender to retreat from a
23
deadly confrontation. The no-retreat rules are grounded in
notions that victims need not yield their rights, surrender their
24
dignity, or reveal their weak side to aggressive wrongdoers.
Requiring retreat, it is said, might put innocent people at risk as
they escape an aggressor bolstered by apparently successful
21. Joseph H. Beale, Jr., Retreat from a Murderous Assault, 16 HARV. L. REV. 567,
581 (1903).
22. “The morgue is full of people who hoped for the best from their attackers
and were dead wrong . . . . The security that comes from knowing how to protect
yourself cannot be equaled.” JAMES D. BREWER, THE DANGER FROM STRANGERS:
CONFRONTING THE THREAT OF ASSAULT 119 (1994). See also Rollin M. Perkins, SelfDefense Re-Examined, 1 UCLA L. REV. 133, 135 (1954) (concluding that nondeadly
force is allowed when (1) the defender reasonably believes a battery or unlawful
imprisonment is imminent, (2) force is proportional to the force it is intended to
prevent, and (3) the defender reasonably believes the harm cannot be avoided
without using defensive force).
23. ARIZ. REV. STAT. § 13-411 (2001); TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-11-611(a) (2001);
TEX . PENAL CODE ANN. § 9.32(a)(2) (2002); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-2-402(3) (2002);
People v. Humphrey, 921 P.2d 1, 20 n.1 (Cal. 1996); People v. Garcia, 28 P.3d 340,
348 (Colo. 2001); Johnson v. State, 315 S.E.2d 871, 873 (Ga. 1984); State v.
McGreevey, 105 P. 1047, 1051-52 (Idaho 1909); People v. Rodriguez, 543 N.E.2d
324, 328 (Ill. App. Ct. 1989); Page v. State, 40 N.E. 745, 745-46 (Ind. 1895); State v.
Scobee, 748 P.2d 862, 867 (Kan. 1988); Sikes v. Commonwealth, 200 S.W.2d 956,
960 (Ky. 1947); Cook v. State, 467 So. 2d 203, 211 n.7 (Miss. 1985); State v. Merk,
164 P. 655, 658 (Mont. 1917); Runion v. State, 13 P.3d 52, 59 (Nev. 2000); State v.
Horton, 258 P.2d 371, 373 (N.M. 1953); Kirk v. Territory, 60 P. 797, 805 (Okla.
1900); State v. Hatcher, 706 A.2d 429, 435 (Vt. 1997); State v. Allery, 682 P.2d 312,
316 (Wash. 1984). See also JOSHUA DRESSLER, UNDERSTANDING CRIMINAL LAW 226
(3d ed. 2001) (“At least until recently, and perhaps still, a slim majority of
jurisdictions applied the rule that a non-aggressor is permitted to use deadly force
to repel an unlawful deadly attack, even if he is aware of a place to which he can
retreat in complete safety.”).
24. “If a defender is obligated to retreat, he is obligated to give way to the
forces of Unrecht or the Wrong.” GEORGE P. FLETCHER, RETHINKING CRIMINAL LAW
865 (1978). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65 (1965) reporters notes
(“The interest of the actor in his personal dignity has been regarded as of greater
importance than the social interest in the prevention of deadly affrays, and in the
preservation of life and limb of those engaged in them.”).
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25

dominance.
Twenty-nine states have resisted the stand-your-ground ethos
and require a would-be defender to try to avoid using deadly force,
26
including a retreat “to the wall” if it can be done safely. The rules
are characterized as a triumph of civility over the American
tendency to stand one’s ground: “[A]ll human life, even that of an
27
aggressor, should be preserved if at all possible.” The Model
Penal Code advises that any “bullies” who dare to exploit the
retreat rule should be met not with force, but with a report to the
28
police. However, in these jurisdictions flight from a nondeadly
altercation generally is not required, and even flight from a deadly
threat is rarely mandatory because many rules specify that the
person retreating actually knows that a completely safe place exists
29
and that she can get there unharmed.
Three U.S. jurisdictions claim a “middle ground” that shuns a
categorical duty to retreat but still scrutinizes the defender’s
25. DRESSLER, supra note 23, at 227 (explaining that requiring retreat “might
embolden aggressors; and innocent people, if required to retreat, might be killed
while fleeing”).
26. ALA. CODE § 13-A-3-23(b)(1) (2002); ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.335 (2001);
ARK. CODE ANN. § 5-2-607(b) (2001); CONN. GEN. STAT. § 53a-19(b) (2001); DEL .
CODE. ANN. tit. 11, § 464(e)(2) (2001); HAW. REV. STAT. § 703-304(5)(b) (2001);
NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1409(4)(b) (2002); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 627:4(III)(a)
(2002); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4(b)(2)(b) (2002); N.Y. PENAL LAW § 35.15(2)(a)
(2002); N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2)(b) (2002); 18 PA. CONS. STAT. §
505(B)(2)(ii) (2002); Thompson v. State, 552 So. 2d 264, 266 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1989); State v. Badgett, 167 N.W.2d 680, 683 (Iowa 1969); State v. Laverty, 495
A.2d 831, 832 (Me. 1985); Burch v. State, 696 A.2d 443, 458 (Md. 1997);
Commonwealth v. DeCaro, 269 N.E.2d 673, 674 (Mass. 1971); Pond v. People, 8
Mich. 150, 176 (1860); State v. Johnson, 277 Minn. 368, 373, 152 N.W.2d 529, 532
(1967); State v. Jordan, 646 S.W.2d 747, 751 (Mo. 1983); State v. Stevenson, 344
S.E.2d 334, 335 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986); State v. Jackson, 490 N.E.2d 893, 896 (Ohio
1986); State v. Charles, 647 P.2d 897, 903 (Or. 1982); State v. Martinez, 652 A.2d
958, 961 (R.I. 1995); State v. Long, 480 S.E.2d 62, 63 (S.C. 1997); State v.
Stumbaugh, 132 N.W. 666, 674 (S.D. 1911); Vaiden v. Commonwealth, 53 Va. 717,
729 (1855); State v. Boggess, 512 S.E.2d 189, 195 (W. Va. 1998); Baier v. State, 891
P.2d 754, 760 (Wyo. 1995). In all jurisdictions, no retreat is required from an
intruder’s attack in the home. See infra note 37 and accompanying text. See also
WAYNE R. LAFAVE, CRIMINAL LAW 498 (3d ed. 2000).
27. DRESSLER, supra note 23, at 227.
28. M ODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 cmt. 4(c) at 54 (Official Draft 1985).
29. Id. at 54-55 (“retreat is only a requisite if the actor knows that he can
avoid the need to use such force with complete safety by retreating”). See also
DRESSLER, supra note 23, at 228 (“The practical effect of these conditions is that
people under attack rarely are compelled to retreat, especially when the aggressor
is armed with a gun . . . .”); ARNOLD H. LOEWY, CRIMINAL LAW IN A NUTSHELL 74 (3d
ed. 2000) (noting that retreat from nondeadly attack generally is not required).
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behavior. In the District of Columbia, a defender who fails to
retreat might convey that a case of “true self-defense” did not
30
exist.
Louisiana and Wisconsin dismiss a duty to retreat but
nonetheless assess the “possibility of escape” and “opportunity to
31
retreat” in determining whether force was appropriate.
Even though deep differences in the nation’s retreat rules may
32
embody “deeper ideological clashes” about criminal law, the
competing policies draw on two basic tenets of self-defense law:
33
34
necessity and proportionality. Where retreat is required, deadly
force is deemed necessary only when the defender feels he had “no
choice” but to kill or when he confidently chose the “lesser evil”;
where defenders may stand their ground, killing is necessary
35
because personal liberty has been threatened. Under rules of
30. Gillis v. United States, 400 A.2d 311, 313 (D.C. 1979) (explaining the
“middle ground” approach that “does not impose a duty to retreat but does allow a
failure to retreat, together with all the other circumstances, to be considered by
the jury in determining if there was a case of true self-defense”).
31. State v. Brown, 414 So. 2d 726, 729 (La. 1982) (“Although there is not an
unqualified duty to retreat the possibility of escape is a recognized factor in
determining whether or not a defendant had the reasonable belief that deadly
force was necessary to avoid the danger.”); State v. Wenger, 593 N.W.2d 467, 471
(Wis. Ct. App. 1999) (“While Wisconsin has no statutory duty to retreat, whether
the opportunity to retreat was available may be a consideration regarding whether
the defendant reasonably believed the force used was necessary to prevent or
terminate the interference.”), review denied, 599 N.W.2d 409 (Wis. 1999).
32. FLETCHER, supra note 24, at 874.
33. Necessity in the criminal context is “[a] justification defense for a person
who acts in an emergency that he or she did not create and who commits a harm
that is less severe than the harm that would have occurred but for the person’s
actions.” BLACK’ S, supra note 2, at 1053. See also Stephen J. Schulhofer, The Gender
Question in Criminal Law, 7 SOC. PHIL. & POL’ Y 105, 117 (1990) (asserting that in
self-defense killings, “the touchstone for the courts is always necessity”). But see
Perkins, supra note 22, at 133 (concluding that necessity in the self-defense context
is based on “false conclusions drawn from incomplete generalizations”).
34. A basic tenet of self-defense law is that returned force must “not be
unreasonable or disproportionate relative to the interest defended.” FLETCHER,
supra note 24, at 870.
35. Columbia Law School professor George P. Fletcher outlines three
competing notions of necessity as it relates to self-defense law: (1) Necessity as an
excuse. The defender is at the wall and involuntarily sees “no choice” but to kill.
Because most people would do the same thing, his act is morally and legally
permissible. (2) Necessity as a choice involving “lesser evils.” Although the “lesser
evils” theory normally favors preserving life over property or dignity, an aggressor
is said to forfeit his right to life by starting a fight and, subsequently, the evil of
killing is lessened. Fletcher says this is the dominant self-defense theory in the
United States. (3) Necessity as vindication of autonomy. Defenders are entitled to
kill aggressors who try to take away liberty, just as sovereign nations are entitled to
expel invaders. This notion of necessity manifests most visibly in the castle
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proportionality, “one must submit to a box on the ear and seek
redress in the courts if he is unable to prevent it by means other
36
than resort to deadly force.”
3.

The “Castle” Exception

Even retreat-to-the-wall jurisdictions recognize an exception: a
person attacked in or around the home may stand her ground and
37
fight, regardless of whether safe escape is known or possible. As
38
“handed down to us through many generations,” the “castle
39
doctrine” frequently contains caveats that only nondeadly force is
40
proper for “mere civil trespass” and that the defender had no fault
41
in instigating the conflict.
The Supreme Court endorsed the doctrine in 1895, ruling in
Beard v. United States that a faultless defendant who was “where he
had the right to be” need not consider retreat when his assailant
“advanced upon him in a threatening manner, and with a deadly
42
weapon[.]”
doctrine. Fletcher says “the first two models of necessary defense readily support a
duty to retreat prior to killing the assailant . . . .” FLETCHER, supra note 24, at 85665.
36. Perkins, supra note 22, at 136. Proportionality has bred differentiation
between deadly force and nondeadly force and has helped define categories of
defense of person, defense of habitation and defense of property. FLETCHER, supra
note 24, at 871.
37. DRESSLER, supra note 23, at 228. Of course, a person withstanding attack
still may choose retreat. See FURNISH & SMALL, supra note 11, at 71 (“For many
individuals, confrontation would be too fearful. Even an armed and fairly
confident householder might at some moment panic and flee, his retreat having
nothing to do with the retreat rule.”).
38. State v. Phillips, 187 A. 721, 721 (Del. 1936).
39. Defense of habitation “stems from the law’s early view that a man’s home
is his ‘fortress’ or ‘castle.’” FRED E. INBAU ET AL., CASES AND COMMENTS ON CRIMINAL
LAW 198 (3d ed. 1983). See also definition of “castle doctrine,” supra note 2. See,
e.g., ALASKA STAT. § 11.81.335(b)(1) (2001) (requiring retreat before using deadly
force unless the defender is on premises that he owns or leases); M INN. STAT. §
609.065 (2001) (permitting deadly force to prevent “great bodily harm or death”
or commission of a felony in the actor’s place of abode); NEV. REV. STAT. § 200.160
(2001) (justifying homicide when used to resist “a felony upon the slayer, in his
presence, or upon or in a dwelling, or other place of abode in which he is”).
40. INBAU, supra note 39, at 199.
41. “[T]he law is well settled that the ‘castle’ doctrine can be invoked only by
one who is without fault in bringing the conflict on.” United States v. Peterson,
483 F.2d 1222, 1237 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
See also M ODEL PENAL CODE §
3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A) at 56 (Official Draft 1985) (stating that an individual is not
required to retreat from the home unless the actor was the initial aggressor).
42. 158 U.S. 550, 560, 564 (1895). Cf. Allen v. United States, 164 U.S. 492,
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The castle doctrine’s rationale is that there is not (or at least
43
should not be) a place safer than home.
[T]he dwelling-place exception to the retreat rule
recognizes the importance of the sovereign person’s
ability to retain control of the single place in the world
that is most clearly his or her own, not necessarily in the
sense that the individual holds title to it, but rather in the
sense that it is the place in which that person’s decisions
and actions are least susceptible
to intrusion from the
44
requirements of others.
Castle and sovereign person are defined broadly. Front
porches and similar “curtilage” around a home usually receive the
law’s protection—sometimes even broader protection than in
45
search-and-seizure cases. Trailers in mobile home parks, cribs in
farmyards, automobiles on public highways, and even tents in
46
public campgrounds have been considered castles. Guests,
babysitters and household employees have been among those
47
shielded.
530 (1896) (limiting Beard to defense of habitation and allowing a general duty to
retreat in other instances).
43. “The rationale is that a person in her own home has already retreated ‘to
the wall,’ as there is no place to which she can further flee in safety.” State v.
Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 1343 (Ohio 1997).
44. ROBERT F. SCHOPP, JUSTIFICATION DEFENSES AND JUST CONVICTIONS 86
(1998).
45. Compare State v. Bonano, 284 A.2d 345, 347 (N.J. 1971) (refusing to
require retreat from a front porch) with Commonwealth v. Perdue, 564 A.2d 489,
492 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1989) (holding that police needed no warrant to search a
garbage can underneath the defendant’s porch), appeal denied, 574 A.2d 604 (Pa.
1990). See also People v. Canales, 624 N.W.2d 918, 921 (Mich. 2001) (Corrigan,
C.J., dissenting) (noting that extending the retreat exception to the “curtilage”
surrounding the home “has serious implications for the use of deadly force in
densely populated urban areas”).
46. State v. Borwick, 187 N.W. 460, 463 (Iowa 1922) (“When [a person] takes
his family or friends or guests into his car and drives out upon the public street, we
think it no undue stretch of the principle to hold that the car is (in a restricted
sense, perhaps), for the time being, his castle . . . .”); State v. Baird, 640 N.W.2d
363, 369 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (ordering new trial when jurors were instructed
that co-residents had a duty to retreat from a motor home), review granted, No. C101-894, 2002 Minn. LEXIS 324 (May 14, 2002); State v. Frizzelle, 89 S.E.2d 725,
726 (N.C. 1955) (“[T]he curtilage of the home will ordinarily be construed to
include at least the yard around the dwelling house as well as the area occupied by
barns, cribs, and other outbuildings . . . .”); State v. Marsh, 593 N.E.2d 35, 38
(Ohio Ct. App. 1990) (“[F]or purposes of a duty to retreat, a tent and a home are
the logical equivalent of each other.”).
47. People v. White, 484 N.Y.S.2d 994 (Sup. Ct. 1984) (extending protection
to “nonresident family members, household employees, baby-sitters, social guests
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But there are limits. A prison may not be a home worthy of
defense, and merely owning a dwelling may not make one a
48
resident in it. The domicile is not a venue for violence: “The
49
home provides a haven, not an arena.”
4. Retreat Requirements When Co-Residents Are Involved
Nineteen states do not require retreat inside or outside the
home, leaving thirty-two jurisdictions to grapple with whether the
50
castle doctrine applies to co-residents. Among those thirty-two
jurisdictions, seven join the Restatement (Second) of Torts in
requiring a home-dweller to consider retreat before defending
against a co-resident with deadly force. In North Dakota, the law is
51
set by statute. Elsewhere, the rules have been established by
52
53
courts that stress notions of necessity, the precious quality of
and others”); State v. Stevenson, 344 S.E.2d 334, 336-37 (N.C. Ct. App. 1986)
(holding that “neither permanency of residence nor a leasehold interest in the
premises is required before a person is legally justified in standing her ground”).
48. People v. Fisher, 420 N.W.2d 858, 864 (Mich. Ct. App. 1988) (refusing to
protect a property owner who had not lived at the premises for eight months),
rev’d on other grounds, 503 N.W.2d 50 (Mich. 1993); State v. McCray, 324 S.E.2d 606,
615 (N.C. 1985) (refusing to consider a prison a self-defense claimant’s “home”).
49. State v. Herriges, 455 N.W.2d 635, 638 (Wis. Ct. App. 1990) (holding that
an actor who provoked a fight in his home may not invoke the no-duty-to-retreat
rule).
50. See supra Part II.A.2.
51. N.D. CENT. CODE § 12.1-05-07(2)(b) (2002). In 1983, the North Dakota
Supreme Court rejected a claim that the statute violates the U.S. Constitution
because it requires defenders to differentiate between co-residents and
nonresidents. State v. Leidholm, 334 N.W.2d 811, 821 (N.D. 1983).
52. State v. Shaw, 441 A.2d 561, 566 (Conn. 1981) (stating tenant who rented
a bedroom not allowed to defend against co-occupant); Cooper v. United States,
512 A.2d 1002, 1006 (D.C. 1986) (holding that “evidence that the defendant was
attacked in his home by a co-occupant did not entitle him to an instruction that he
had no duty whatsoever to retreat”); State v. Necaise, 466 So. 2d 660, 663, 667 (La.
1985) (holding that the “trial judge was duty bound to include a statement on the
possibility of retreat” for a woman charged with killing her abusive husband in
their bedroom”); State v. Grierson, 69 A.2d 851, 854 (N.H. 1949) (holding that
the “privilege of the [no-retreat] rule does not exist [for co-residents] and the
person must retreat if this is a reasonable means of avoiding the danger”); State v.
Ordway, 619 A.2d 819, 824 (R.I. 1992) (noting that “the obligation to attempt
retreat exists even when one is assaulted in his or her own living quarters by his or
her co-occupant”); State v. Crawford, 66 S.E. 110, 110 (W. Va. 1909) (holding that
the castle doctrine did not apply when “defendant and deceased were at the time
of the homicide jointly occupying the house where the killing occurred”). See also
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 65 reporters notes (1965) (“[T]he exceptional
privilege to stand one’s ground in a dwelling which is the final place of refuge
should not apply as against an assailant who is also within his own dwelling place
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54

human life, the duties that even unrelated co-residents owe each
55
other, and a distaste for sanctioning “the reenactment of the
56
climactic scene from ‘High Noon’ in the familial kitchens[.]”
Eighteen states where retreat generally is required outside the
home maintain exceptions for residents who face attack from
fellow co-residents. Statutes in Hawaii, Nebraska, and Pennsylvania
follow the Model Penal Code, which requires retreat from a co57
worker but not a co-resident. A recently altered statute now
permits co-residents to stand their ground in New Jersey, where the
state’s supreme court had expressed “grave concerns” over a
statutory “loophole in the castle doctrine” that required a co58
resident’s retreat. Fourteen of the eighteen states have set rules
59
through common law. Some courts say co-residents have no place
and castle.”).
53. “[T]he right of self-defense is born of necessity and should terminate
when the necessity is no more.” State v. Quarles, 504 A.2d 473, 476 (R.I. 1986)
(holding that a co-resident facing an attack from another co-resident must attempt
retreat).
54. See State v. Shaw, 441 A.2d 561, 566 (Conn. 1981) (explaining that the coresident retreat rule “is in line with a policy favoring human life over the burden
of retreating from the home”).
55. Cooper v. United States, 512 A.2d 1002, 1006 (D.C. 1986) (“[A]ll cooccupants, even those unrelated by blood or marriage, have a heightened
obligation to treat each other with a degree of tolerance and respect.”).
56. State v. Shaw, 441 A.2d 561, 566 (Conn. 1981).
57. M ODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04(2)(b)(ii)(A) (Official Draft 1985) (“[T]he
actor [contemplating deadly force] is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling or
place of work, unless he was the initial aggressor or is assailed in his place of work
by another person whose place of work the actor knows it to be.”); see also HAW.
REV. STAT. § 703-304(5)(b)(i) (2001); NEB. REV. STAT. § 28-1409(4)(b)(i) (2001);
18 PA. CONS. STAT. § 505(B)(2)(ii)(A) (2002). Originally, Model Penal Code
drafters required a co-resident’s retreat, but a vote taken during American Law
Institute proceedings in 1958 resulted in the current guideline. See M ODEL PENAL
CODE § 3.04 cmt. 4(c) at 56 (Official Draft 1985).
58. Compare N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4b(2)(b)(i) (2002) (holding that “[t]he
actor is not obliged to retreat from his dwelling, unless he was the initial
aggressor”) with N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:3-4b(2)(b)(i) (1998) (including the
additional language “or is assailed in his dwelling by another person whose
dwelling the actor knows it to be”). In 1997, the New Jersey Supreme Court urged
the co-resident retreat law to be reconsidered “in the case of a spouse battered in
her own home.” State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 571 (N.J. 1997). See also Melissa
Wheatcroft, Note, Duty to Retreat for Cohabitants — In New Jersey a Battered Spouse’s
Home Is Not Her Castle, 30 RUTGERS L.J. 539, 542 (1999) (concluding that New
Jersey had “inexcusably burden[ed] battered persons living with their batterers,
forcing them to attempt a nearly impossible escape, risk serious bodily harm, or
face prison terms for actions that would be excused if the assailant was a stranger
rather than a cohabitant”).
59. See Wilkinson v. State, 374 So. 2d 396, 399-400 (Ala. Crim. App. 1979)
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60

besides the home for a safe retreat, that it is illogical to require a
61
victim to distinguish between intruders and co-residents, and that
it is unfair to force a faultless victim to try to avoid peril when
62
attacked in what should be one’s safest place.
(approving jury instruction in a spousal homicide case that retreat law was
inapplicable because the defendant was in the home), writ denied, 374 So. 2d 400
(Ala. 1979); Thomas v. State, 583 S.W.2d 32, 37 (Ark. 1979) (noting that “an
occupant of the house” need not retreat from an encounter with a fellow
occupant); State v. Phillips, 187 A. 721, 721 (Del. 1936) (ruling that a “lawful
occupant” need not retreat when “violently attacked by another occupant, in
circumstances showing an imminence of death or of great bodily harm”); Weiand
v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999) (joining “the majority of jurisdictions
that do not impose a duty to retreat from the residence when a defendant uses
deadly force in self-defense, if that force is necessary to prevent death or great
bodily harm from a co-occupant”); State v. Jacoby, 260 N.W.2d 828, 835 (Iowa
1977) (endorsing State v. Leeper, 200 N.W. 732, 736 (Iowa 1925), in which the
court stated, “[t]he fact that the assailant is also an occupant of the home, with an
equal right there, does not put upon the one assaulted any duty to retreat”); State
v. Laverty, 495 A.2d 831, 833 (Me. 1985) (ruling that the “dwelling place
exception” to the general rule that requires retreat applies to co-residents); People
v. Lenkevich, 229 N.W.2d 298, 300 (Mich. 1975) (holding that the victim of an
attack by a non-intruder “is without fault [and] need not ‘retreat to the wall’
before defending herself”); State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 402 (Minn. 2001)
(“There is no duty to retreat from one’s own home when acting in self-defense in
the home, regardless of whether the aggressor is a co-resident.”); State v. Hafeli,
715 S.W.2d 524, 528-29 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (noting that it was error not to
instruct the jury that a co-resident is covered by the retreat exception); People v.
Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497 (N.Y. 1914) (noting that it “never has been the law”
that one must retreat from attack in one’s own home); State v. Browning, 221
S.E.2d 375, 377 (N.C. Ct. App. 1976) (noting that the state supreme court had not
addressed a co-resident’s duty to retreat, and holding that retreat is not required
from home or curtilage regardless of “whether the assailant be an intruder or
another lawful occupant of the premises”); State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339,
1343 (Ohio 1997) (reasoning that “one is not required to retreat from one’s own
home when attacked by an intruder; similarly one should not be required to
retreat when attacked by a cohabitant in order to claim self-defense”); State v.
Sales, 328 S.E.2d 619, 620 (S.C. 1985) (ruling that defendant could “claim
immunity from the law of retreat” when he intervened to protect his sister in her
house when she was attacked by a live-in boyfriend); State v. Burtzlaff, 493 N.W.2d
1, 8 (S.D. 1992) (upholding a jury instruction that a wife facing her husband’s
abuse in the home “had the right to stand her ground”).
60. People v. Tomlins, 107 N.E. 496, 497-98 (N.Y. 1914) (“[A] man assailed in
his own dwelling . . . is under no duty to take to the fields and the highways, a
fugitive from his own home . . . . The rule is the same whether the attack proceeds
from some other occupant or from an intruder.”).
61. State v. Thomas, 673 N.E.2d 1339, 1343 (Ohio 1997). “There is no
rational reason for a distinction between an intruder and a cohabitant when
considering the policy for preserving human life where the setting is the domicile
. . . .” Id.
62. People v. Lenkevich, 229 N.W.2d 298, 300 (Mich. 1975) (holding that the
victim of an attack by a non-intruder “is without fault [and] need not ‘retreat to
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Six states with general duties to retreat appear not to have
63
addressed the co-resident question directly. Additionally, the law
is in disarray in Massachusetts, where in 1975 the supreme judicial
court withstood “widespread criticism” after ruling that a woman
abused by her mate had a duty to retreat from her home before
64
killing him. In response, the legislature passed a law allowing
residents to stand their ground against people unlawfully in a
65
dwelling.
Subsequently, the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial
Court has stressed that retreat still may be required when an
66
assailant is lawfully on the premises.
5. The Special Circumstances of Domestic Violence
Too often, homes are violent places. Reliable data are difficult
67
68
to obtain and countless crimes go unreported, but a few recent
the wall’ before defending herself”).
63. They are Alaska, Maryland, Oregon, Virginia, Wisconsin, and Wyoming.
Two of the states have not required a resident to retreat from invited guests. See
Gainer v. State, 391 A.2d 856, 861 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1978); Reid v.
Commonwealth, No. 1783-92-1, 1994 Va. App. LEXIS 370, at *9 (Va. Ct. App. June
14, 1994). Oddly, the Kentucky Supreme Court twice has required residents to
retreat from invited guests even though retreat generally is not required outside
the home. See Baker v. Commonwealth, 202 S.W.2d 1010, 1012 (Ky. 1947); Oney
v. Commonwealth, 9 S.W.2d 723, 725 (Ky. 1928). In Wyoming, a jury instruction
that a guest need not retreat before acting in defense was rejected because the
claim involved self-defense, not defense of habitation. State v. Eldredge, 21 P.2d
545, 547 (Wyo. 1933).
64. Commonwealth v. Shaffer, 326 N.E.2d 880, 883 (Mass. 1975) (ruling that
the retreat-to-the-wall rule “has equal application to one assaulted in his own
home”). LLOYD L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES, COMMENT, QUESTIONS 206 (6th
ed. 1998) (“The decision in Shaffer prompted much discussion and widespread
criticism from persons who asserted that the defendant was an example of the
battered woman.”).
65. 1981 M ASS. ACTS c. 696 (codified as M ASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278, § 8A
(2002)). See also Commonwealth v. Peloquin, 754 N.E.2d 703, 705 n.3 (Mass. App.
Ct. 2001) (noting that the statute was a response to Shaffer, 326 N.E.2d at 883),
overruled on other grounds, 770 N.E.2d 440 (Mass. 2002).
66. Commonwealth v. Lapointe, 522 N.E.2d 937, 942 (Mass. 1988). See also
Commonwealth v. Peloquin, 770 N.E.2d 440, 444 (Mass. 2002) (concluding that
M ASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 278 § 8A (2002) does not allow a resident to stand his ground
against an invited guest); Commonwealth v. Noble, 707 N.E.2d 819, 823 (Mass.
1999) (noting that trespass law should be used to determine intruders in duty-toretreat cases).
67. See The Structure of Family Violence: An Analysis of Selected Incidents, FBI
UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS 1, available at http://www.fbi.gov/ucr/nibrs/
famvio21.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2002) (noting that “the involvement of family
members, friends, and acquaintances is not delineated” for most violent crimes);
EVE S. BUZAWA & CARL G. BUZAWA, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE: THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE
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statistics of reported crimes offer a glimpse. In 2000, 53% of
violent-crime victims in the United States knew the offender, 61%
of simple assaults were committed by people known to the victim,
and one in five violent crimes on a woman was done by an
69
“intimate.” When a death resulted and police could determine a
relationship between the victim and alleged killer, a family
70
member, boyfriend, or girlfriend was responsible 31% of the time.
Retreat rules and other self-defense laws, ostensibly crafted
from a male perspective, are of particular importance to women
71
because they most often are victims of at-home violence.
Commentators and researchers often assert that rules requiring
retreat ignore evidence that a woman is more likely to be killed by
72
her partner when she leaves an abusive relationship, and that
women and their children who flee abuse often have no safe place
73
to go. Requiring retreat is seen as ignoring battered woman
RESPONSE 8, 10 (2d ed. 1996) (concluding that because no single entity collects
domestic violence data, statistics “are of necessity inexact, with official statistics that
are not accepted as definitive”).
68. In 1999, an estimated 54% of violent crimes were not reported to police;
nearly 60% of simple assaults went unreported. SOURCEBOOK OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE
STATISTICS 2000, p. 208 (28th ed.) (U.S. Department of Justice data), available at
http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/t338.pdf (last visited Sept. 29,
2002).
69. Id. at 196, available at http://www.albany.edu/sourcebook/1995/pdf/
t317.pdf (last visited Sept. 29, 2002).
70. Data are for murders and non-negligent manslaughters in 2000.
Relationships were known in 7,428 of the nation’s homicides; 3,308 of the victims
(44.5%) were acquaintances or friends; 2,306 (31.0%) were family members,
boyfriends or girlfriends; 1,688 (22.7%) were strangers; and 126 (1.6%) were
neighbors, employees, or employers. Relationships were not delineated in 5,515
of the 12,943 cases. Id., Table 3.141, available at http://www.albany.edu/
sourcebook/1995/pdf/t3141.pdf (last visted Sept. 29, 2002).
71. See State v. Gartland, 694 A.2d 564, 570 (N.J. 1997) (concluding that male
pronouns in self-defense statutes “reflect a history of self-defense that is derived
from a male model”); DENISE KINDSCHI GOSSELIN, HEAVY HANDS: AN INTRODUCTION
TO THE CRIMES OF DOMESTIC V IOLENCE 16 (2000) (summarizing expert research
that men are victims in approximately 5% of domestic-violence cases, although
“[s]ome researchers suggest that the incidence of male battered may be as high as
female battering”).
72. “Women who leave their abusive partners are most vulnerable to being
beaten and killed, up to 75 percent greater than for those who stay.” GOSSELIN,
supra note 71, at 15. See also B. Sharon Byrd, Putative Self-Defense and Rules of
Imputation in Defense of the Battered Woman, in FOUNDATIONS OF CRIMINAL LAW 265
(Katz et al. eds., 1999) (“She may have tried to escape in the past with the result
that her husband has found her and beaten her even more brutally.”).
73. “Because judges and juries often are not aware of the limited escape
opportunities feasible, they may assume she could have just walked out the door,
called the police, or sought refuge in a battered woman’s shelter.” Erica Beecher-
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74

syndrome and is said to further stereotypes that an abused woman
75
may leave at any time.
As noted researcher Lenore E. Walker wrote in her landmark
1979 treatise The Battered Woman: “In a society where women are
culturally indoctrinated to believe that love and marriage are their
true fulfillment, nothing is lost by pretending that they are free to
76
leave home whenever the violence becomes too great.” Still,
University of Chicago law professor Stephen J. Schulhofer asserts
that many women do escape abuse, and those who do not “should
have to prove the concrete circumstances that prevented them
77
from doing likewise.”
The effect of retreat rules on battered women has been
contentious in Florida, where the issue was certified as a question
of “great public importance” in 1999 and a controversial supreme
court case requiring retreat was overruled after the state’s governor
78
granted clemency to six battered women convicted of murder. In
Monas, Domestic Violence: Competing Conceptions of Equality in the Law of Evidence, 47
LOY. L. REV. 81, 111-12 (2001).
74. See BLACK’ S, supra note 2, at 146 (defining battered-woman syndrome as
“[t]he medical and psychological condition of a woman who has suffered physical,
sexual, or emotional abuse at the hands of a spouse or lover. This syndrome is
sometimes proposed as a defense to justify a woman’s killing of a man”). In
Minnesota, battered woman syndrome is a “scientifically recognized and accepted
psychological syndrome” for women, but not for men. State v. Nystrom, 596
N.W.2d 256, 260 (Minn. 1999). See also State v. Borchardt, 478 N.W.2d 757, 761
(Minn. 1991) (agreeing that “male sexual victimization” theory has not “reached
the required level of scientific acceptance” for admission in a homicide trial).
75. “The feminist position has generally been hostile to retreat rules on the
theory that they too easily dissolve into questions about why the woman did not
leave the relationship rather than whether the knife was poised above her head.”
V.F. Nourse, Self-Defense and Subjectivity, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 1235, 1280 (2001). See
also Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1054 (Fla. 1999) (explaining the “common
myth” that women can leave an abusive relationship at any time).
76. LENORE E. WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN 29 (1979). Walker is a
professor at Nova Southeastern University.
For a biography, see
http://www.cps.nova.edu/faculty/Ffultime/walker/walker.html (last visited Sept.
29, 2002).
77. Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 129. Women who kill abusive mates because
they cannot leave or have been “pursued, beaten, and dragged back” after a
previous escape deserve to be acquitted, Schulhofer says. “[C]ourts and juries can
be led to understand that a person in that situation would have reasonably
concluded that escape was impossible.” Id.
78. See Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1047 (agreeing to reconsider the co-resident
duty-to-retreat rule under Fla. Const. art. V, § 3(b)(4), which affords the Florida
Supreme Court discretionary jurisdiction to review questions “of great public
importance”), overruling State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724, 726 (Fla. 1982) (holding
that the no-retreat rule does not apply when co-residents “had equal rights to be in
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reversing a seventeen-year-old rule, the Florida Supreme Court
acknowledged an “increased understanding of the plight of victims
79
of domestic violence.” The court singled out studies showing that
80
retreat may increase a battered woman’s chance of being killed
and recognized fears that jurors may be confused by duty-to-retreat
81
instructions.
The change in Florida, recognized as a “step forward in
82
affording more protection to victims of domestic violence,” is
typical of efforts to make laws fairer for women by erasing duty-to83
retreat rules. However, a researcher who studied 223 cases in
the ‘castle’ and neither had the legal right to eject the other”). In Weiand, the
court said: “We now conclude that it is appropriate to recede from Bobbitt . . . .
We join the majority of jurisdictions that do not impose a duty to retreat from the
residence when a defendant uses deadly force in self-defense, if that force is
necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm from a co-occupant.” 732 So. 2d
at 1051. See also Julie Hauserman, Six Battered Women Who Killed Are Freed, ST.
PETERSBURG TIMES, Dec. 30, 1998, at A1 (explaining that the women, who were
freed on Christmas Eve 1998 as news helicopters circled the prison, had told
stories of their abuse to Florida’s Cabinet and Gov. Lawton Chiles during a
clemency hearing. Chiles died two days afterward. Clemency was granted by Gov.
Buddy MacKay. Some relatives of people who were killed were outraged) “Three
trials and three juries found her guilty. Then, a bunch of politicians up there just
turn her loose,” one relative said. “Where’s the justice in that?” Id.
79. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1051. The court also abandoned the argument that
retreat is required because one co-resident has no right to eject the other: “[O]ur
decision in Bobbitt appears to have been grounded upon the sanctity of property
and possessory rights, rather than the sanctity of human life.” Id. at 1052.
80. Id. at 1053 (quoting LENORE E. WALKER, TERRIFYING LOVE: WHY BATTERED
WOMEN KILL AND HOW SOCIETY RESPONDS 65 (1989): “[T]he batterer would often
rather kill, or die himself, than separate from the battered woman”; and DONALD
G. DUTTON, THE BATTERER: A PSYCHOLOGICAL PROFILE 15 (1995), who cited a case
study showing that 45% of women’s murders “were generated by the man’s ‘rage
over the actual or impending estrangement from his partner’”).
81. Weiand, 732 So. 2d at 1054 (noting that a jury instruction on requiring a
victim’s retreat furthers an incorrect stereotype about women’s ability to leave an
abusive relationship).
82. Christy S. Etheredge, Comment, The Castle Doctrine: Extension of the Rule to
Co-inhabitants, 3 FLA. L. REV. 695, 702 (2000).
83. See, e.g., CYNTHIA K. GILLESPIE, JUSTIFIABLE HOMICIDE: BATTERED WOMEN,
SELF-DEFENSE, AND THE LAW 187-88 (1989) (asserting that requiring retreat is unfair
to women defendants); Phyllis L. Crocker, The Meaning of Equality for Battered
Women Who Kill Men in Self-Defense, 8 HARV. WOMEN’ S L.J. 121, 144 (1985)
(advocating expert testimony in cases of battered woman’s syndrome); Kit
Kinports, Defending Battered Women’s Self-Defense Claims, 67 OR. L. REV. 393, 416
(1988) (suggesting a “reasonable battered woman” standard); Cathryn Jo Rosen,
The Excuse of Self Defense: Correcting a Historical Accident on Behalf of Battered Women
Who Kill, 36 AM. U. L. REV. 11, 46 (1986) (“Treatment of all self-defense as an
excuse would further the criminal justice system’s interest in discouraging selfhelp, promote society’s interest in preserving the sanctity of human life, and fulfill
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which women appealed convictions for killing their mates
challenged the view that discriminatory self-defense laws are solely
to blame: “[T]he most common impediments to fair trials for
battered women are the result not of the structure or content of
84
existing law but of its application by trial judges.”
B. In Minnesota
1. Defending Self and Home: The Basics
From Minnesota’s infancy, the state’s courts and legislature
have stressed that force used in self-defense must be necessary and
proportional to the threatened harm. The state’s first reported
case on self-defense came in 1859, one year after statehood, as the
Minnesota Supreme Court ruled that a defendant anticipating a
blow from a cane was not justified in hitting his would-be assailant
85
with disproportionate force.
“Every assault will not justify a
battery; and whether the degree of force used by the defendant was
justified by the occasion, is a question to be determined on the
86
evidence.” A few years later, the court stressed that a defender
may harm another person only to prevent even greater harm.
“Self-defense . . . must not exceed the bounds of mere defense and
prevention. To justify such act there must be at least an apparent
87
necessity to ward off by force some bodily harm.”
In the years that followed, Minnesota’s courts and legislature
consistently scrutinized levels of force to determine reasonable
88
responses to threatened harm. Today, deadly force generally is
the feminist goal of absolving battered women who kill of guilt without
proclaiming that such women are inferior to men.”). But see DRESSLER, supra note
23, at 236 (“Is it fair to hold a diminutive and weak man who lacks self-defense
skills to the standard of a ‘reasonable man,’ if the latter standard assumes that
males are tall, strong, and experienced in combat?”).
84. Holly Maguigan, Battered Women and Self-Defense: Myths and Misconceptions
in Current Reform Proposals, 140 U. PA. L. REV. 379, 383 (1991).
85. Gallagher v. State, 3 Minn. 185, 187 (1859). A review of Minnesota’s
earliest supreme court decisions revealed that Gallagher provided the state’s first
reported common-law rule of self-defense.
86. Id. The court urged that force used to prevent an assault must be
proportional: “[T]he party thus assaulted may strike or use a sufficient degree of
force to prevent the intended blow, without retreating at all.” Id.
87. State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 231 (1865).
88. See, e.g., State v. McKissic, 415 N.W.2d 341, 344 (Minn. 1987) (noting that
even if a defendant’s actions satisfy the elements of self-defense, jurors still may
convict when they find that “the amount of force used was unreasonable under the
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89

available to a defender who fears “great bodily harm or death,”
90
while “reasonable” force is allowed to protect property.
Amid threats at home, however, a “peculiar immunity” from
91
general self-defense rules has evolved, and under Minnesota’s
defense-of-dwelling statute a defender may use deadly force merely
to stop an intruder from committing a felony, regardless of
92
whether she fears harm. The burden is on the state to prove that
93
the defender was not justified in her actions.
By allowing a home-dweller to use deadly force when faced
with a felony, the state’s defense-of-dwelling law appears broader
94
than the modern norm. The Minnesota Court of Appeals has said
the statute “may exceed what most people would think permissible
95
under the law.”
circumstances”); State v. Bland, 337 N.W.2d 378, 381 (Minn. 1983) (clarifying that
force used in self-defense is “limited to that which a reasonable person in the same
circumstances would believe to be necessary”); State v. McCuiston, 514 N.W.2d
802, 806 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (noting that no force would be allowed to resist
insurance fraud in one’s dwelling).
89. M INN. STAT. § 609.065 (2001) (allowing a killing “when necessary in
resisting or preventing an offense which the actor reasonably believes exposes the
actor or another to great bodily harm or death, or preventing the commission of a
felony in the actor’s place of abode”).
90. M INN. STAT. § 609.06, subd. 1(4) (2001) (noting that “reasonable force
may be used upon or toward the person of another without the other’s consent
when . . . used by any person in lawful possession of real or personal property, or
by another assisting the person in lawful possession, in resisting a trespass upon or
other unlawful interference with such property”).
91. State v. Touri, 101 Minn. 370, 374, 112 N.W. 422, 424 (1907) (noting that
the home has “peculiar immunity” because “it is sacred for the protection of . . .
person and . . . family”).
92. M INN. STAT. § 609.065; State v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897, 903 (Minn.
1999) (holding that under a defense-of-dwelling claim, a defender need not fear
harm before using deadly force to thwart an intruder’s felonious act).
93. State v. Harvey, 277 N.W.2d 344, 346 (Minn. 1979) (reversing a murder
conviction because the state “merely established that defendant did the shooting”
and did not prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was not justified in killing
during an apparent home robbery).
94. See J. David Jacobs, Privileges for the Use of Deadly Force Against a ResidenceIntruder: A Comparison of the Jewish Law and the United States Common Law, 63 TEMP.
L. REV. 31, 49-50 (1990) (noting that “there is no longer a right to kill in order to
prevent any felony”). Early common law allowed deadly force to fend off a felony
because all felonies were punishable by death anyway. Today, deadly force
normally is reserved for “dangerous” or “atrocious” felonies. Id. at 48-49. See also
FLETCHER, supra note 24, at 861 (noting that the “absolute right to prevent the
commission of a felony” is “often made, but typically unfounded in the law”).
95. State v. McCuiston, 514 N.W.2d 802, 805-07 (Minn. Ct. App. 1994)
(ordering a new trial when a defense-of-dwelling instruction was omitted. “The
legislature made a policy judgment that persons should be able to claim self-
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2. The Retreat Rule in General
Minnesota is among the twenty-nine states where retreat must
be considered: a defender generally must consider retreat before
96
using deadly force. Unlike states that require flight only when the
defender actually knows that a safer place exists and that she can
get there safely, Minnesota imposes the duty when retreat is
97
“reasonably possible.”
Minnesota is not among the states with a duty-to-retreat
98
statute. The issue was “left to judicial development” four decades
ago when the current criminal code was drafted and the standard
99
of “reasonable” defensive force was codified.
The current retreat rule can be traced to State v. Shippey, a case
of “outrageous and barbarous revenge” from 1865 in which the
Minnesota Supreme Court provided dictum on when an innocent
person may defend himself: “Self-defense can only be resorted to in
case of necessity. The right to defend himself would not arise until
defendant had at least attempted to avoid the necessity of such
100
defense.”
Shippey’s duty-to-retreat language was imported into
Minnesota’s common law a century later in State v. Johnson, which,
unlike Shippey, featured a defendant who was more of a defender
101
than an aggressor. The dictum became law when the Minnesota
Supreme Court looked to the 1963 Criminal Code’s advisory
committee for help determining what the legislature meant by
102
“reasonable force” in the then-new statutes. The committee said
the reasonableness standard was to be guided by two cases from the

defense in their own home even if their actions would not meet all the conditions
of self-defense occurring elsewhere . . . . [I]t is not our role to debate the wisdom
or parameters of the statutory language[.]”), review denied, No. C8-93-1378, 1994
Minn. LEXIS 448 (June 15, 1994).
96. State v. Johnson, 277 Minn. 368, 373, 152 N.W.2d 529, 532 (1967).
97. State v. Austin, 332 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Minn. 1983). Cf. State v. Quarles, 504
A.2d 473, 476 (R.I. 1986) (“The person attacked is obligated to attempt retreat if
he or she is aware of a safe and available avenue of retreat.”).
98. Cf. supra note 26 and accompanying text.
99. PROPOSED M INNESOTA CRIMINAL CODE 29-30 (Minnesota Legislative
Interim Commission, 1962).
100. State v. Shippey, 10 Minn. 223, 230-32 (1865).
101. Johnson, 277 Minn. at 373, 152 N.W.2d at 532. The Johnson court
characterized the defendant as “a young man whose girlfriend had been rudely
treated and who, out of a mistaken sense of chivalry, thought something should be
done about it.” Id. at 374, 152 N.W.2d at 533.
102. Id. at 373, 152 N.W.2d at 532.
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103

1800s, including Shippey. The Johnson court also used Shippey to
justify the law of retreat, even though the defendant in the century104
old case “was the pursuer not the pursued[.]”
Shippey’s dictum on the duty to retreat, as stated in Johnson,
105
remains part of Minnesota law. It is “well settled that there is a
duty to retreat and avoid danger if reasonably possible” before
106
using deadly defensive force in Minnesota.
3. The Retreat Rule in and Around the Home
Consistent with the castle doctrine, Minnesota does not
107
require retreat from a home intrusion.
The rationale was
articulated a century ago when the Minnesota Supreme Court
permitted a landowner in the “vast wilderness” to stand his ground
108
when his foe had a gun nearby. “Self-defense has not, by statute
nor by judicial opinion, been distorted, by an unreasonable
109
requirement of the duty to retreat, into self-destruction.”
While defense of home and curtilage are staunchly defended
in Minnesota, it has been unclear what levels of force defenders
may use and, consequently, when there might be a duty to

103. Id. at 372, 152 N.W.2d at 532; PROPOSED M INNESOTA CRIMINAL CODE, supra
note 99, at 30. The other case that the 1963 Criminal Code advisory committee
singled out as stating the “reasonable force” standard was State v. Tripp, 34 Minn.
25, 24 N.W. 290 (1885), which involved an assault conviction with little mention of
self-defense and no mention of retreat. See PROPOSED M INNESOTA CRIMINAL CODE,
supra note 99, at 30.
104. Johnson, 227 Minn. at 373, 152 N.W.2d at 532; Shippey, 10 Minn. at 231.
105. Self-defense according to Johnson:
requires (1) the absence of aggression or provocation on the part of
the slayer; (2) the actual and honest belief of the slayer that he was in
imminent danger of death, great bodily harm, or some felony and it
was necessary to take the action he did; (3) the existence of reasonable
grounds for such belief; and (4) the duty of the slayer to retreat or
avoid the danger if reasonably possible.
Id. at 373, 152 N.W.2d at 532. However, an anticipated felony does not justify selfdefense anymore. See State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 285 (Minn. 1997)
(omitting the “or some felony” language from Johnson). See also supra note 94.
106. State v. Austin, 332 N.W.2d 21, 24 (Minn. 1983). See also State v. Nystrom,
596 N.W.2d 256, 261 (Minn. 1999) (“Self-defense is not available to one who
abandons a successful retreat and elects instead to make an aggressive choice to
confront the victim.”).
107. See supra Part II.A.3; State v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897, 903 (Minn.
1999).
108. State v. Gardner, 96 Minn. 318, 320, 328, 104 N.W. 971, 972, 975 (1905).
109. Id. at 327, 104 N.W. at 975.
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110

retreat. As recently as 1997, deadly force was available under a
self-defense claim as long as the actor feared death or great bodily
harm, while deadly force was allowed under a defense-of-dwelling
111
claim regardless of the actor’s fears.
Oddly, Minnesota law had favored property over human life,
and in 1999 the supreme court addressed that “anomaly” in State v.
112
Carothers.
In that case, which involved a felony-murder
conviction, the court ordered a new trial because the jury was
instructed that a duty to retreat attaches to a defense-of-dwelling
113
claim.
The supreme court ruled that the instruction was
erroneous and clarified that a home-dweller facing an intruder’s
felonious act need not retreat before using deadly force, regardless
of the home-dweller’s fears or which common-law doctrine he pled:
To require a person claiming self-defense to retreat but
not require a person claiming defense of dwelling to
retreat would provide greater protection to a person
safeguarding property than to a person safeguarding life.
As the law clearly values life above property, a person
claiming self-defense within the home should
not have a
114
duty to retreat before using deadly force.
4. The Retreat Rule When Co-Residents Fight
The Carothers court specifically refused to consider whether the
115
no-retreat rule applies to co-residents acting in self-defense.
110. See Steve Fenlon, Recent Developments: Criminal Law, 26 WM. MITCHELL L.
REV. 1263, 1263 (2000) (noting that self-defense and defense of dwelling were not
distinguished until recently in Minnesota). See also FLETCHER, supra note 24, at
855, 857 (“The theory of self-defense, defense of others and defense of property is
torn by its conflicting and uncertain premises . . . . It is unlikely that protecting
property would be seen as the kind of case where the defender has ‘no choice’ but
to kill.”).
111. State v. Pendleton, 567 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1997) (distinguishing
between provisions in section 609.065 of the Minnesota Statutes by concluding
that “‘reasonable force’ includes deadly force only when the offense against a
person involves great bodily harm or death or is used to prevent the commission
of a felony in one’s home”).
112. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d at 903.
113. Id. at 897, 904.
114. Id. at 903-04. Some jurisdictions specify felonies that a home-dweller must
anticipate before using deadly force, such as arson, burglary, or robbery. LAFAVE,
supra note 26, at 505. The Model Penal Code allows deadly force to protect
property only amid a threat of dispossession or when the wrongdoer is attempting
arson, burglary, robbery, “or other felonious theft or property destruction[.]”
M ODEL PENAL CODE § 3.06(3)(d) (Official Draft 1985).
115. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d at 904 n.6.

Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 2002

21

William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 29, Iss. 2 [2002], Art. 5
FINAL AGGERGAARD GLOWACKI.DOC

678

10/28/2002 11:15 PM

WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 29:2

Therefore, the issue was left unsettled.
Guidance on the co-resident retreat issue has been
inconsistent over the years. In 1911, the supreme court did not
require a sailor attacked in his bunk room to retreat from “where
he slept and kept his clothing, and when he was about as close to
116
the ‘wall’ as it was possible to get.”
However, in 1985 the
supreme court permitted a duty-to-retreat instruction in an
apparent home-invasion case when the eventual homicide victim
allegedly “came barging in” to a dwelling, grabbed a knife, and
threatened to kill the resident, who was subsequently convicted of
117
murder. A few years later, the court articulated no opposition
when juries twice were instructed that Minnesotans must consider
ways to avoid “peril” in their homes before using deadly force
118
against co-residents and guests.
In 2001, with an apparent appetite to settle decades of
discrepancies, the Minnesota Supreme Court attempted to address
119
the co-resident retreat issue head-on in Glowacki.
III. THE GLOWACKI CASE AND DECISION
A. Facts
A jury convicted William Glowacki

120

of misdemeanor fifth-

116. State v. McPherson, 114 Minn. 498, 499-500, 131 N.W. 645, 645-46 (1911)
(holding that a fireman on a vessel in the Duluth harbor did not have to retreat
from the bunk room when a fellow fireman attacked him there).
117. State v. Sanders, 376 N.W.2d 196, 198, 201 (Minn. 1985). The defendant
conceded, perhaps contrary to Minnesota law, that a duty-to-retreat instruction was
proper in a home-intrusion case. Id. at 201.
118. State v. Hennum, 441 N.W.2d 793 (Minn. 1989), aff’g in part, State v.
Hennum, 428 N.W.2d 859, 866 (Minn. Ct. App. 1988) (endorsing a jury
instruction that a co-resident must have “consider[ed] the existence of an
alternative way of avoiding the peril” before using deadly force); State v. Morrison,
351 N.W.2d 359, 360, 362 (Minn. 1984) (affirming a jury instruction that the
defendant had a duty to retreat from her home before stabbing someone who
apparently was not an intruder). See also State v. Baird, 640 N.W.2d 363, 367
(Minn. Ct. App. 2002) (noting that the supreme court had “appeared to approve
[of] jury instructions imposing a duty to retreat on defendants claiming selfdefense when the incident occurred inside the defendant’s home and the
defendant and the victim were co-residents”), review granted, No. C1-01-894, 2002
Minn. LEXIS 324 (May 14, 2002).
119. State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392, 399 (Minn. 2001) (noting that
Carothers reserved the issue of a co-resident’s duty to retreat).
120. Glowacki was a member of the City Council in Corcoran, Minnesota.
After his conviction, he was met by a dozen protesters who demanded his
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121

degree assault, domestic assault, and disorderly conduct after
hearing markedly different versions of an altercation at his home
122
with his girlfriend, Priscilla Andrews.
123
Glowacki claimed Andrews hit him first.
He said the lefthanded blow to his shoulder came as Andrews leaned over him,
screamed “horrible things,” and kept her right hand behind her
124
back – perhaps, according to Glowacki, to conceal something.
Glowacki said he responded by kicking Andrews to the floor, telling
125
her to “knock it off,” and walking away. Upon turning to face
Andrews, Glowacki testified that he pushed Andrews to the floor
126
after seeing something moving toward his head. Moments later,
as Andrews was seated on a couch to cool off, Glowacki testified
127
that he withstood a kick to the left thigh. Glowacki said he then
vowed to take Andrews to a hotel; she responded by swearing and
128
yelling she was going to destroy him. Andrews went upstairs, and
129
police arrived shortly thereafter and arrested Glowacki.
Andrews testified that Glowacki hit her and that she did not hit
130
back. A blow to the side of the head felled her, and while on the
floor Andrews said she endured death threats and fifty to 100
131
kicks. Once able to stand, Andrews testified that Glowacki put his
hands around her throat, ripped a button from her robe, and told
resignation and carried signs such as “Woman beaters are not leaders” and “Bill is
a Black Eye in our Community.” Andrew Tellijohn, Corcoran council member not
planning to resign, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis), Aug. 27, 1999, at 3B. Glowacki was
sentenced to forty-five days in the workhouse even though the prosecution had
requested a fifteen-day sentence and he had no prior convictions.
In
characterizing Glowacki’s conduct as “that of a thug,” Hennepin County District
Judge Thorwald Anderson denied Glowacki work release or home monitoring and
assessed the maximum misdemeanor fine of $700. At the time, it was considered
rare to send a first-time domestic violence offender to the workhouse. Margaret
Zack, Corcoran council member sent to workhouse for assault, STAR TRIB. (Minneapolis),
Sept. 2, 1999, at 1B.
121. M INN. STAT. § 609.224, subd. 1 (2001); M INN. STAT. § 609.2242, subd. 1
(2001); M INN. STAT. § 609.72, subd. 1(3) (2001).
122. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 395-97. The supreme court identified Andrews
by name in its opinion; the Minnesota Court of Appeals, however, used only her
initials. Cf. State v. Glowacki, 615 N.W.2d 843, 844 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
123. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 396.
124. Id.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id.
129. Id.
130. Id. at 395.
131. Id.
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132

her to “[g]et the hell out of my goddamn house.” In all, she
testified that she endured about 20 minutes of abuse before locking
133
herself in a bathroom and calling for help.
To counter Glowacki’s claim of self-defense at trial, the
prosecution requested that jurors be instructed that there is always
134
a duty to retreat from one’s home when acting in self-defense.
The request was based on the Minnesota Court of Appeals’
135
decision in Carothers, which the prosecution assured was good law.
In fact, the Minnesota Supreme Court had overruled the court of
appeals two months earlier, holding that there is no duty to retreat
136
from the home when defending against an intruder. Glowacki’s
counsel did not disagree that the court of appeals decision was
good law, even as the trial court expressed doubts, and jurors were
instructed that an actor claiming self-defense must “avoid the
137
danger if reasonably possible.”
On appeal, Glowacki argued inter alia that the assault verdicts
should be overturned because jurors were erroneously instructed
that he “had a duty to avoid danger in his own home while acting
138
in self-defense[.]” The court of appeals agreed and awarded a
new trial on the assault convictions, ruling that the trial court
139
committed “significant” error by instructing the jury erroneously.
132. Id.
133. Id.
134. Id. at 397.
135. Id.
136. State v. Carothers, 585 N.W.2d 64 (Minn. Ct. App. 1998), rev’d 594
N.W.2d 897 (Minn. 1999). See also supra note 114 and accompanying text.
137. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 397. The parties agreed to the trial judge’s
suggestion that the words “retreat or” be removed from 10 M INNESOTA PRACTICE:
M INNESOTA JURY INSTRUCTION GUIDES – CRIMINAL (4th ed. 1999) CRIMJIG 7.08,
which says: “The legal excuse of self-defense is available only to those who act
honestly and in good faith. This includes the duty to retreat or avoid the danger if
reasonably possible.” This was the instruction given to the jury. Glowacki, 630
N.W.2d at 397 n.1.
138. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 397. The defendant did not object to the jury
instruction at trial. At sentencing he moved for a new trial based on the district
court judge’s reliance on the erroneous court of appeals decision. The motion
was denied. The trial judge interpreted Carothers as applying to defense of
dwelling, not self-defense. Id. Glowacki appealed three other matters to the
supreme court, which were subsequently referred to the court of appeals. Id. at
403. On remand, the appeals court (1) concluded again that Glowacki and
Andrews were co-residents, (2) upheld the trial court’s decision to disallow
questions about a lawsuit Andrews was contemplating against Glowacki, and (3)
dismissed a sentencing challenge because he already had served the time. State v.
Glowacki, No. C8-99-1507, slip op. at 3-7 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 9, 2001).
139. State v. Glowacki, 615 N.W.2d 843, 845 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000)
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140

The Minnesota Supreme Court agreed that jurors in
Glowacki’s trial were instructed incorrectly, but the error was
deemed harmless and the court reinstated the assault conviction by
ruling as a matter of law that even if Glowacki’s version of events
141
were taken as true, his force was not reasonable. Besides denying
Glowacki a new trial, the court adopted a new no-retreat rule and
professed to join a majority of states that do not require flight from
142
one’s home when faced with attack from a co-resident. In its
143
analysis, the court considered arguments from amicus curiae,
noted an American Law Review annotation on the duty to retreat in
144
145
homicide cases, and examined rules in five other jurisdictions.
The court also recognized how difficult it can be to distinguish co146
residents from nonresidents, surveyed the probable effect on
147
women who face domestic violence, and asserted that a parent
148
facing attack should not have to abandon her children.
The supreme court’s opinion also stressed that it is unfair to
149
force a co-resident to retreat from her “safest place.” The court
(concluding that the jury instructions misstated the law), aff’d in part, 630 N.W.2d
392 (Minn. 2001).
140. The defendant’s motion for a new trial preserved his right to appeal
under M INN. R. CRIM. P. 26.03, subd. 18(3) because the trial court and counsel
“were operating under a misconception of the status of the law.” See Glowacki, 630
N.W.2d at 398.
141. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 402-03. Although the jury instruction did not
include the word “retreat,” it was said to be implied. Id. at 402.
142. “[W]e adopt the following rule: There is no duty to retreat from one’s
own home when acting in self-defense in the home, regardless of whether the
aggressor is a co-resident.” Id. at 402. To conclude that “a majority of other states”
do not require a co-resident to attempt retreat from the home, the court relied on
Linda A. Sharp, Annotation, Homicide: Duty to Retreat Where Assailant and Assailed
Share the Same Living Quarters, 67 A.L.R.5th 637 (1999). Id. at 400 n.3. [The
supreme court’s citation erroneously referred to A.L.R.5th vol. 65; the annotation
is found in vol. 67].
143. The Minnesota County Attorneys Association backed a rule favoring a coresident’s duty to retreat; the Minnesota Association of Criminal Defense Lawyers
did not. See Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 398.
144. Sharp, supra note 142.
145. See Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 400-03 (examining rules in Connecticut, the
District of Columbia, Florida, New Jersey, and New York).
146. Id. at 400.
147. Id. at 401 (“Instructing a jury on a duty to retreat may therefore
contradict a battered spouse defense.”).
148. Id. at 401 (“[T]he duty to retreat also may force an abused spouse to
choose between acting against the law or abandoning her children.”).
149. Id. (“Requiring retreat from the home before acting in self-defense would
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acknowledged that co-resident quarrels are self-defense issues more
150
than defense-of-dwelling issues, but it justified an exception from
the general self-defense rule requiring retreat because the rule
presumes that a fleeing resident has a safer place to go — namely,
151
the home.
The supreme court was careful not to endorse the carte
blanche use of violence, stressing that in a dispute between coresidents the “key inquiry will still be into the reasonableness of the
use of force and the level of force under the specific circumstances
152
of each case.” And further refinement of the Glowacki rule may
be forthcoming: In May 2002 the court granted review to a case
153
involving a fight between co-residents in a trailer.

require one to leave one’s safest place.”).
150. “Defense of dwelling is a defense based on property rights and thus is
only available against one who does not have rights to the dwelling. The defense
of dwelling defense is not appropriate when the party against whom the force is
used has rights to the dwelling as well.” Id. (citing State v. Hare, 575 N.W.2d 828,
832 (Minn. 1998)).
151. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 401.
152. Id. at 402.
153. State v. Baird, 640 N.W.2d 363 (Minn. Ct. App. 2002), review granted, No.
C1-01-894, 2002 Minn. LEXIS 324 (May 14, 2002). In Baird, the appeals court
ordered a new trial because jurors were erroneously instructed that the co-resident
defendant had a duty to retreat from his motor home. Id. at 370. Reconsideration
of Baird, without oral argument, was set for Sept. 11, 2002. The supreme court
seemed poised to determine whether Glowacki applies retroactively. The fight in
Baird occurred June 16, 2001; the supreme court decided Glowacki on July 12,
2001. Id. at 365. In effect, the appeals court applied Glowacki retroactively because
it said the case neither overruled clear past precedent nor decided an issue of first
impression that could not have been clearly foreshadowed. Id. at 368. Appellant
state of Minnesota argues in Baird that because Glowacki was “a fundamental
change” in self-defense law, the trial judge’s instruction was not erroneous and the
rule should not be applied retroactively. Brief for Appellant at 16, State v.
Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. 2001) (No. C8-99-1507). Respondent Baird
asserts that because duty-to-retreat law has been unsettled in Minnesota recently,
Glowacki “did not overrule anything” and the court of appeals was correct to order
a new trial. Brief for Respondent at 14, 18, State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392
(Minn. 2001) (No. C8-99-1507).
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IV. ANALYSIS OF THE GLOWACKI DECISION
A. Some Unanswered Questions
1. Who Was the Aggressor?
154

Generally, aggressors may not claim self-defense.
If the
jurors believed Glowacki was an aggressor—which seems likely,
155
given his conviction —then analysis under self-defense and duty156
to-retreat rules is irrelevant and inappropriate. The issue appears
to be not the contents of the duty-to-retreat jury instruction, but
157
whether one should have been given at all.
Glowacki claimed he did not start the fight, and the supreme
court adopted his story as true to rule as a matter of law that his use
158
of force, even in self-defense, was unreasonable. The court could
have stopped there, reinstated the conviction, acknowledged that
justice was done, and reserved the co-resident retreat question for
the legislature or for a case in which facts were less disputed and
154. See Bellcourt v. State, 390 N.W.2d 269, 272 (Minn. 1986) (noting that an
aggressor “has no right to a claim of self-defense”). See also LAFAVE, supra note 26,
at 497 (“It is generally said that one who is the aggressor in an encounter with
another . . . may not avail himself of the defense of self-defense.”).
155. See supra Part III.A. See also State v. Sanders, 376 N.W.2d 196, 199 (Minn.
1985) (noting that a jury is “free to consider and weigh all the evidence” in a selfdefense claim); DRESSLER, supra note 23, at 224 (“[T]he issue of whether a
defendant lost the right of self-defense in a conflict is ordinarily a matter for the
jury to decide, based on a proper instruction on the meaning of the term
‘aggressor.’”).
156. However, it is possible that Glowacki regained his right to self-defense if
he demonstrated withdrawal from the conflict and Andrews then responded to his
nondeadly force with deadly force. See Bellcourt, 390 N.W.2d at 272 (noting that
jurors may be instructed on self-defense “only if [an aggressor] actually and in
good faith withdraws from the conflict and communicates that withdrawal,
expressly or impliedly, to his intended victim”). See also DRESSLER, supra note 23, at
225 (noting that “[m]any courts provide that when the victim of a nondeadly
assault responds with deadly force, the original aggressor immediately regains his
right of self-defense”).
157. Jury instructions could have been tailored to whether the jury found
Andrews or Glowacki to be the aggressor. Cf. People v. Emmick, 525 N.Y.S.2d 77,
79 (App. Div. 1988) (striking a conviction after the trial judge erroneously
instructed the jury on a duty to retreat). “At the very least, the court should have
charged the jury that if they found, as a matter of fact, that defendant was in his
own dwelling, then he was under no duty to retreat.” Id.
158. “[E]ven if the jury accepted Glowacki’s version of events, no reasonable
juror could conclude that his use of force to defend himself was reasonable.”
Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 403.
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159

levels of force used more apparent.
Instead, the court made a new rule and remanded the case so
160
issues besides retreat could be addressed. On remand, the court
of appeals rejected Glowacki’s assertion that the state failed to
161
prove that he was the aggressor.
Consequently, by reasoning
“that the jury reasonably could have concluded that Glowacki was
not engaged in self-defense[,]” the appeals court cast even more
doubt on whether the matter should have been a duty-to-retreat
162
case in the first place.
2. What Levels of Force Does the Rule Cover?
Usually no-retreat rules are at issue only in cases of deadly, or
163
at least felonious, force.
In keeping with that trend, the
Minnesota Supreme Court analyzed co-resident retreat rules from
homicide and felony assault cases in other jurisdictions before
164
articulating the co-resident no-retreat rule in Glowacki.

159. Andrews’ status in the home was among significant facts in dispute. The
defendant called her an intruder, the trial court labeled her an invited guest, the
court of appeals called her a co-resident, and the supreme court did not address
the issue even though Glowacki continued to argue that Andrews did not have
equal rights to the dwelling and was considered hostile and unwelcome by the
homeowner. Id. at 400; Brief for Respondent at 9, State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d
392 (Minn. 2001) (No. C8-99-1507). It is unclear how the trial court’s
characterization of Andrews as an invited guest might have affected the jury’s
guilty verdict.
160. See supra note 138.
161. State v. Glowacki, No. C8-99-1507, slip op. at 5 (Minn. Ct. App. Oct. 9,
2001).
162. Id.
163. “[T]he question of the duty to retreat is a problem only when deadly
force is used in self-defense[.]” LAFAVE, supra note 26, at 498. See also State v.
Baker, 280 Minn. 518, 523, 160 N.W.2d 240, 243 (1968) (noting that “principles of
self-defense in felonious assault and homicide cases are not materially different”);
State v. Pearson, 215 S.E.2d 598, 602 (N.C. 1975) (noting it “particularly
important” to distinguish between deadly force and nondeadly force in cases
involving retreat rules); M ODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 cmt. 4(c) at 53 (Official Draft
1985) (noting that requiring retreat “never has been accepted when moderate
force is used in self-defense”).
164. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 400. Four of the five cases cited involved deaths:
Cooper v. State, 512 A.2d 1002 (D.C. 1986) (voluntary manslaughter); State v.
Gartland, 694 A.2d 564 (N.J. 1997) (reckless manslaughter); Weiand v. State, 732
So. 2d 1044 (Fla. 1999) (second-degree murder); State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d 724
(Fla. 1982) (manslaughter); State v. Shaw, 441 A.2d 561 (Conn. 1981) (involving a
felony assault conviction in which the victim was shot three times). Id.
Additionally, the Minnesota Supreme Court relied on an American Law Reports
annotation, supra note 142, that analyzed only homicide cases.
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However, the underlying dispute was charged under
misdemeanors including fifth-degree assault, which is the least
165
serious level of misdemeanor assault in Minnesota. Therefore,
the court unwisely used a misdemeanor appeal to make law
intended for, or at least likely to be extended to, felonies.
Consequently, trial courts undoubtedly will struggle with whether
Glowacki applies to all criminal assault cases or only to those in
which deadly or perhaps felonious force was apparent.
3. What Is Reasonable Force?
The court said the reasonableness test ultimately will govern
166
self-defense cases involving co-residents. However, leaving level167
of-force decisions to “specific circumstances of each case” does
little to help co-residents who would rather not inflict injury, face
arrest, or risk prosecution.
Minnesota is among states adhering to the “older principle” of
168
unreasonableness in self-defense law.
A mistaken Minnesota
defender, such as one who wrongly perceives nondeadly force to be
deadly force, risks conviction for murder or another “crime of
purpose” when he should be convicted of a lesser offense that
169
incorporates reduced culpability such as negligence. The Model
Penal Code singles out statutes such as Minnesota’s as among those
that should be altered so judges and prosecutors do not exert
170
discretion in mistaken-defender cases.
As it stands, the Glowacki reasonableness test creates more
171
questions than it provides answers. Specifically, it is unclear when
165. Statutes for other levels of assault address more serious degrees of harm:
M INN. STAT. § 609.221 (2001) (first-degree assault, “great bodily harm”); M INN.
STAT. § 609.222 (2001) (second-degree assault, assault with a dangerous weapon);
M INN. STAT. § 609.223 (2001) (third-degree assault, “substantial bodily harm”);
M INN. STAT. § 609.2231 (2001) (fourth-degree assault encompasses bias-motivated
assaults and force used against public officials).
166. “[I]n all situations in which a party claims self-defense, even absent a duty
to retreat, the key inquiry will still be into the reasonableness of the use of the
force and the level of force under the specific circumstances of each case.”
Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 402.
167. Id.
168. M ODEL PENAL CODE § 3.09 cmt. 2 at 153 (Official Draft 1985). The Model
Penal Code’s drafters say sections 609.065 and 609.06 of the Minnesota Statutes,
supra notes 89 and 90, which are essentially unchanged from when the Model
Penal Code was drafted, are among the older statutes. Id. at 153-54 n.12.
169. Id. at 153.
170. M ODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 cmt. 2 at 36 (Official Draft 1985).
171. Reasonableness has been called “[o]ne of the most common standards
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a defender may abandon general rules of proportionality to
172
counter nondeadly abuse with deadly force. Does size matter?
Must the defender follow general rules of self-defense, minus the
retreat requirement, and reserve deadly force for when “great
173
bodily harm” is feared, or may she rely on Carothers to oppose a
174
nondeadly slap in the face with a stab to the heart?
B. Some Shaky Reasoning
The Minnesota Supreme Court based the new co-resident noretreat rule on four presumptions: (1) home is the “safest place”
and one should not be forced from it, (2) a retreat rule would
confuse juries in cases of battered spouse’s syndrome, (3) parents
should not have to choose between following the law and
defending children, and (4) it can be difficult to distinguish
175
intruders from co-residents.
The first assertion is wrong, the
second is a problem more with trial procedure than criminal law,
176
and the third already is anticipated by an existing statute.
used in the common law for judging almost every form of conduct[.]” Byrd, supra
note 72, at 264. See also Seth D. DuCharme, Note, The Search for Reasonableness in
Use-of-Force Cases: Understanding the Effects of Stress on Perception and Performance, 70
FORDHAM L. REV. 2515, 2520 (2002) (“[T]he defendant [in a self-defense case] will
not prevail if the fact-finder determines that the amount of force used was
unreasonable. But unreasonable to whom?”).
172. See Perkins, supra note 22, at 136 (“Where there is great disparity of
strength between the two, death or great bodily harm is possible without any
weapon, and circumstances may justify deadly force to repel such an attack.”).
173. State v. Pendleton, 567 N.W.2d 265, 268 (Minn. 1997) (ruling that deadly
force will be “reasonable force” only amid threatened “great bodily harm or death”
or to prevent a felony in one’s home).
174. “A resident has traditionally been empowered to use force, even deadly
force, when necessary to protect the home.” State v. Carothers, 594 N.W.2d 897,
900 (Minn. 1999). In Minnesota, it is unclear when a foot or fist can constitute a
dangerous weapon capable of causing felonious force, such as under section
609.222 of the Minnesota Statutes. Compare State v. Born, 280 Minn. 306, 308, 159
N.W.2d 283, 285 (Minn. 1968) (concluding that chasing a victim, punching him to
the floor and stomping him could constitute use of dangerous weapons) and State
v. Mings, 289 N.W.2d 497, 498 (Minn. 1980) (agreeing that cowboy boots could be
considered dangerous weapons) with State v. Basting, 572 N.W.2d 281, 284-85
(Minn. 1997) (ruling that a professional boxer’s fist was not a dangerous weapon
in part because the combatants were approximately of the same weight and
height).
175. See supra notes 146-151 and accompanying text.
176. The fourth presumption, while valid, seems exacerbated by an even more
difficult dilemma: What is a home, anyway? In Minnesota, a broad definition of
home is evolving. See, e.g., State v. Griller, 583 N.W.2d 736, 741 (Minn. 1998)
(holding that a defendant who raised a defense-of-dwelling claim had at least two
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1. Homes Are Not Safe
As the castle doctrine evolved to offer “a natural sanctuary
177
from external aggression,”
internal aggression silently and
178
insidiously invaded American dwellings. Homes remain unsafe
179
today.
Basing a no-retreat rule on the sanctity and perceived
placidity of the domicile denotes a desire for how things should be
instead of how they are.
Domestic violence is no less severe in Minnesota, despite the
180
state’s leadership role in trying to eradicate it.
An estimated
27,000 Minnesota women were battered in 1999, and while 41% of
181
them were believed injured, only 11% sought medical care.
Among the 123 Minnesota homicides in 2000 in which police could
ascertain a relationship between the alleged killer and the victim,
one-third were committed by family members, boyfriends, or
182
girlfriends.
places of abode); In re Welfare of R.O.H., 444 N.W.2d 294, 294-95 (Minn. Ct. App.
1989) (characterizing an unheated mini storage area as “a structure suitable for
affording shelter for human beings”).
177. DRESSLER, supra note 23, at 228.
178. Christine Daniels, Intimate Violence, Now and Then, in OVER THE
THRESHOLD: INTIMATE VIOLENCE IN EARLY AMERICA 5-16 (Christine Daniels &
Michael V. Kennedy eds., 1999).
179. See supra notes 69-70 and accompanying text. “[I]f there is one point
about which family violence experts seemingly agree, it is that family violence is far
more common than we realize.” BARNETT ET AL., supra note 11, at 13. “Research
consistently demonstrates that many women and children are more likely to be
assaulted in their own homes than on the streets in the most violent American
cities.” Id. at 4.
180. Minneapolis undertook an eighteen-month study in the 1980s, which was
publicized nationwide, that showed that arrest was “by far the most effective
deterrent” to domestic abuse. However, subsequent studies contradicted the
findings. Vito Nicholas Ciraco, Note, Fighting Domestic Violence with Mandatory
Arrest: Are We Winning?, 22 WOMEN’ S RTS. L. REP. 169, 174, 190 (2001). Duluth was
the first U.S. jurisdiction to require alleged abusers to be arrested, and now the
jurisdiction vigorously prosecutes the crimes even when abuser and victim
reconcile. BUZAWA & BUZAWA, supra note 67, at 182.
181. STEPHEN COLEMAN, AN EVALUATION OF M INNESOTA’ S SHELTER PROGRAM FOR
BATTERED WOMEN: A REPORT TO THE M INNESOTA LEGISLATURE 10 (2001), available at
http://www.mincava.umn.edu/papers/shelter.doc (last visited Sept. 29, 2002).
182. There were 138 homicides in Minnesota in 2000. A relationship between
the accused killer and victim was known in 123 of the cases; 49 victims (39.8%)
were acquaintances or friends; 41 victims (33.3%) were family members,
boyfriends, or girlfriends; 28 victims (22.8%) were strangers; and 5 victims (4.1%)
were neighbors, an ex-wife, or someone else known to the accused killer.
Minnesota
Department
of
Public
Safety
data,
available
at
http://www.dps.state.mn.us/bca/cjis/documents/Crime2000/Page-14-005.html#
CRIMINAL%20HOMICIDE%20-%20MURDER (last visited Sept. 29, 2002).
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It is a fantasy to say that Minnesota homes are safe; it is a
fallacy to base a no-retreat rule on such a presumption. If
anything, laws addressing crimes inside the home should be more
183
like those for outside the home, and deadly force should be
discouraged at all costs.
2. Fears for Battered Women Misdirected
The supreme court enacted the co-resident no-retreat rule
amid fears that juries hearing battered woman’s syndrome cases
184
might be confused by retreat rules.
The court’s concerns are
misdirected. The perceived problem is one of trial procedure, not
criminal law. Now a law changed in favor of battered women also
has been altered for siblings, parents, children, roommates,
185
homosexuals, and others who cohabitate for whatever reason.
3. Parents Already Must Protect Their Children
With Glowacki, the court aims to help parents who “will not
have a legal defense under the law” if they stay in the home to
186
protect children. However, parents in such dreadful situations
already have a tool in Minnesota’s child-endangerment statute,
which forbids people from knowingly or recklessly placing children
187
in harm’s way.
A “mere potential for substantial harm to

183. “Rather than seeing family violence and street violence as separate
entities, it is probably helpful to view them as interconnected . . . . [M]en who are
violent in the home, for example, are especially likely to be violent outside the
home.” BARNETT ET AL., supra note 11, at 4. “It is notable to consider the contrast
in criminal law that protects the sanctity of the home from strangers yet does little
to protect the sanctity of the home from co-occupants.” Amy E. Pope, Children as
Victims and Witnesses in the Criminal Trial Process: A Feminist Look at the Death Penalty,
65 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 257, 276 (2002).
184. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 401.
185. See State v. Shaw, 441 A.2d 561, 562 (Conn. 1981) (requiring retreat for
housemates); People v. Emmick, 525 N.Y.S.2d 77, 79 (App. Div. 1988) (holding
that cohabitating brothers need not retreat from each other); BARNETT ET AL.,
supra note 11, at 213 (“There appears to be a strong reluctance within the lesbian
community to acknowledge interpartner aggression.”); GOSSELIN, supra note 71, at
18 (“Frequently, we view battering between men as normal aggressive behavior.
Issues in gay relationships are forcing us to reconceptualize domestic violence.”).
186. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d at 401.
187. M INN. STAT. § 609.378, subd. 1(b)(1) (2001) (defining child
endangerment as “intentionally or recklessly causing or permitting a child to be
placed in a situation likely to substantially harm the child’s physical, mental, or
emotional health or cause the child’s death”).
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188

children” is enough to satisfy the law.
When children watch parents fight, the youngsters risk
189
substantial harm. The state’s child-endangerment law requires –
or should require – parents to shield their children from those
190
hurts by taking whatever measures are necessary.
Sometimes
those measures will include using force in the home; other times,
retreat. Glowacki, however, seems to favor only the first option.
C. Making a Case for a Co-Resident’s Retreat
1. Minnesota’s General Retreat Rule Should Have Applied
The Glowacki court correctly asserted that when co-residents
191
fight, neither has the legal right to eject the other. However, the
court applied the assertion incorrectly. When combatants claim
identical rights to a home, the castle doctrine vanishes and neither
co-resident deserves royal treatment under the law. Therefore, all
that is left is the general rule of self-defense, and in Minnesota that
general rule requires retreat when reasonably possible and permits
192
deadly force only amid fear of death or great bodily harm.
With Glowacki, the court seemed more interested in mending a
gap left by Carothers than in exhaustively examining the effects that
a broadened no-retreat rule might have. Instead of encouraging
restraint, the court has succumbed to the American stand-yourground ethos without exhibiting the precision and logical

188. State v. Hatfield, 627 N.W.2d 715, 720 (Minn. Ct. App. 2001) (affirming
conviction of a father who stored anhydrous ammonia in an altered propane tank
near his children), aff’d, 639 N.W.2d 372 (Minn. 2002).
189. Children who watch marital violence suffer from stress, immediate
trauma, adverse development, and exposure to violent role models. BARNETT ET
AL., supra note 11, at 140.
190. See In re Lonell, 673 N.Y.S.2d 116 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that a woman
who refused to flee her abusive partner was criminally liable for child neglect). In
Minnesota, people who fear that acting to stop child endangerment will result in
“substantial bodily harm” are specifically afforded a defense. See M INN. STAT. §
609.378, subd. 2 (2001).
191. See supra note 150 and accompanying text.
192. See supra note 105. Because there is no intruder during a domestic fight,
it seems the Carothers exception, supra note 114, does not apply. See also Jacobs,
supra note 94, at 46 (“[T]o prevent a forcible intrusion, a lawful resident is
permitted to use deadly force against an intruder who the resident reasonably
believes intends to commit a felony or inflict serious bodily injury imminently
upon anyone in the residence, provided necessity or apparent necessity is
present.”).
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foundation required for making a rule that anticipates life-anddeath scenarios in the home.
2. A Proposed Rule Based on Necessity and Proportionality
The Minnesota Legislature could pass legislation extending
the general retreat rule to co-residents, thereby requiring retreat
193
when reasonably possible.
However, such a standard is no less
vague than the Glowacki rule, and it would heap another layer on a
“reasonableness” pile that already plagues Minnesota self-defense
194
law.
195
Instead, the legislature should return to roots of necessity
196
and proportionality to enact a co-resident retreat rule limited to
instances of deadly force and respectful of the state’s general rule
requiring retreat. A better law would be:
When threatened with deadly force from a co-resident in the
home, a resident who knows that safe retreat is possible must try to
leave the home or otherwise avoid the peril unless he finds defense
necessary to prevent greater peril. Notwithstanding evidence of
193. The state urged such a path in Glowacki. “The law of Minnesota provides
that the duty to retreat attaches ‘if reasonably possible.’ The State is not asking
that the law be changed.” Reply Brief of Appellant at 3, State v. Glowacki, 630
N.W.2d 392 (Minn. 2001) (No. C8-99-1507). The Minnesota County Attorneys
Association, which favored a rule requiring a co-resident’s retreat, suggested that
retreat would be unreasonable when the victim was not dressed for cold weather,
had experienced increased violence when retreating in the past, or was told “if I
see you leaving this house I’ll take it out on the kids next.” Brief of Amicus Curiae
at 8-9, State v. Glowacki, 630 N.W.2d 392 (Minn. 2001) (No. C8-99-1507).
194. Reliance on reasonableness encourages cumbersome legalese. For
example: “The person may use force to defend himself against an assault if he
believes it to be reasonably necessary and if it would appear to a reasonable person
under similar circumstances to be reasonably necessary, with the amount of force
used to defend himself being limited to that which a reasonable person in the
same circumstances would believe to be necessary.” State v. Bland, 337 N.W.2d
378, 381 (Minn. 1983).
195. See discussion of necessity, supra notes 33, 35 and accompanying text.
“The actor who knows he can retreat with safety also knows that the necessity can
be avoided in that way.” M ODEL PENAL CODE § 3.04 cmt. 4(c) at 53 (Official Draft
1985). Necessity is frequently mentioned in Minnesota Supreme Court cases
involving defense in the home. See, e.g., Carothers, 594 N.W.2d at 900 (“A resident
has traditionally been empowered to use force, even deadly force, when necessary
to protect the home.”); State v. Touri, 101 Minn. 370, 374, 112 N.W. 422, 424
(1907) (noting that defense of the home may be done “by any means rendered
necessary by the exigency”).
196. See discussion of proportionality, supra notes 34, 36 and accompanying
text. Proportionality was an issue in the Minnesota Supreme Court’s first case
involving self-defense. See supra notes 85-86 and accompanying text.
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battered woman’s syndrome, only defensive force proportional to
the threatened harm shall be allowed.
This rule, unlike the much-heralded new judge-made law in
Florida, values life over violence because retreat is the starting
197
point. It does not disturb the castle doctrine, but it does resist
the American tendency to endorse a fight when flight is possible
and prudent. Admittedly, the rule would not have changed
Glowacki’s ultimate outcome, but it would eradicate the vague
reasonableness standard and correct the erroneous assumption
that a violent home is a co-resident’s safest place. Because children
might be at risk during a domestic dispute and a deadly weapon is
as handy as the silverware drawer, the proposed law acknowledges
that fights at home differ remarkably from the average bar brawl.
Therefore, the proposal specifically informs co-residents that
retreat is not required to prevent great peril or when safe escape is
not possible, and it singles out battered woman’s syndrome as a
198
phenomenon that courts must not ignore. The proposed rule
resembles a “limited duty to retreat” espoused by Florida courts in
the 1980s, and it also seeks a “middle ground” similar to
jurisdictions that reject a categorical duty to retreat but still
199
scrutinize a defender’s decision to stay.
3. A Plan for the Legislature
Remarkably, the Minnesota Legislature has not addressed the
200
duty to retreat.
The present common-law rule that requires
retreat when “reasonably possible” can be traced in part to dictum
in an 1865 supreme court case that involved a violent aggressor

197. Cf. Weiand v. State, 732 So. 2d 1044, 1051 (Fla. 1999) (not imposing a coresident’s duty to retreat “when a defendant uses deadly force in self-defense, if
that force is necessary to prevent death or great bodily harm from a co-occupant”).
The Minnesota rule proposed in this note would require retreat unless a coresident finds it necessary to thwart great peril.
198. The proposed rule cannot refer to “battered spouses syndrome” because
Minnesota has not recognized a syndrome in trials involving male defendants. See
supra note 74.
199. See supra notes 30-31 and accompanying text; State v. Bobbitt, 415 So. 2d
724, 728 (Fla. 1982) (Overton, J., dissenting) (suggesting that a resident facing
attack from a co-resident must retreat “to the extent reasonably possible” but need
not flee the home); Rippie v. State, 404 So. 2d 160, 162 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
(asserting that a “limited duty to retreat” would require a co-resident to at least
retreat to another room before using deadly force).
200. See supra Part II.B.2.
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201

instead of an innocent defender. It is time for legislators to take
a stand on the duty to retreat, and they should start with examining
and overruling the new co-resident no-retreat rule.
Even if legislators shun the path suggested in this note, they
should reconsider a rule that appears as hastily enacted as it is
logically flawed. Police, prosecutors, domestic violence victims, and
researchers should testify to the effects that a co-resident no-dutyto-retreat rule might have in Minnesota.
Typically Minnesota legislators, not judges, make laws
202
involving the home.
As it stands, the supreme court has
legislated by judicial action – something that, in the court’s own
203
words, “we do not have the authority to do.”
V. CONCLUSION
At best, Glowacki will serve to remind co-residents that
defensive force in the home must be “reasonable.” At worst, the
decision will be seen as suggesting, if not endorsing, that standing
one’s ground during a domestic attack is preferred, even when
retreat is possible and more prudent.
The new rule emanates from a case in which retreat should
not have been an issue and deadly force probably was not used.
However, the rule likely will provide justification for when deadly
force was used. The case craves legislative intervention, particularly
amid signs that legislators have shunned the general duty-to-retreat
201. Id.
202. See, e.g, State v. Gianakos, 644 N.W.2d 409, 419 (Minn. 2002) (noting “the
important social policy objective of . . . deferring to the legislature to determine
public policy with regard to family and marital issues”); State v. Pendleton, 567
N.W.2d 265, 269 (Minn. 1997) (explaining that the court examined legislative
history, the plain meaning of section 609.065 of the Minnesota Statutes, supra note
89, and canons of statutory construction); State v. McCuiston, 514 N.W.2d 802, 806
(Minn. Ct. App. 1994) (“[I]t is not our role to debate the wisdom or parameters of
the [defense-of-dwelling] statutory language . . . .”).
203. State v. Thunberg, 492 N.W.2d 534, 537 (Minn. 1992) (holding that
judicial alteration of the “reasonable person” standard in a manslaughter statute
would violate the separation-of-powers doctrine). See also M INN. CONST., art. III, §
1 (“The powers of government shall be divided into three distinct departments:
legislative, executive and judicial. No person or persons belonging to or
constituting one of these departments shall exercise any of the powers properly
belonging to either of the others . . . .”); State v. Shaw, 441 A.2d 561, 569 (Conn.
1981) (Bogdanski, C.J., dissenting) (noting that the court’s majority opinion
“usurps the legislature’s authority” on the co-resident retreat question); Perkins,
supra note 22, at 161 (asserting that a legislature, not a court, is the proper forum
for abandoning a no-retreat rule).
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issue for 140 years.
It is disappointing, but perhaps not surprising, that the coresident retreat question was decided with a case clouded by factual
uncertainties and legal ambiguities. With clenched fists and
jerking knees, this nation is quick to categorize everyone as either a
204
villain or victim and to reserve retreat as a path only for cowards.
How unsettling it is that as we blindly protect the sanctity of the
domicile, we fail to realize that for many women, men, and
children, the worst dangers are inside the home.

204. “The battered spouse cannot be an offender because, above all, she is
clearly, undeniably, painfully, a victim. The abusive husband who is finally killed
cannot be a real victim because he was so clearly, repulsively in the wrong. This
way of thinking not only contributes to the appeal of the battered spouse defense,
but it underlies other currents opposed to pacifist and demanding principles; for
example, rejection of the duty to retreat.” Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 126.
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